The Panama expedition, 1670–1671

Morgan’s report framed the expedition as service performed under a commission from Modyford with the Jamaican council’s advice. It described evidence of Spanish hostility and the captains’ decision that attacking Panama served Jamaica’s safety. That is the commander’s justification, preserved in the calendar, rather than a neutral verdict from outside the expedition. ^[1]

The framing matters because the attack became part of a political dispute. A commission, an enemy’s alleged actions and the interpretation of peace between crowns all entered the later argument.

The company did not simply sail its Atlantic vessels into Panama’s harbor. The approach passed through Caribbean positions and the Chagres route, requiring a defended river entrance to be secured before the inland advance. Different parts of the force guarded vessels and the route while others continued. ^[1][2]

That arrangement divided people and resources. The force that assembled at sea was not identical to the group present at every inland stage, and the connection back to the vessels remained a practical concern.

The sources describe a transition from boats and river movement to marching through a difficult interior. Supplies were scarce, and the accounts make the removal or absence of food an important part of the pressure on the advancing company. ^[1][2]

The landscape was inhabited and contested. Villages, paths, guides, defenders and supplies shaped the operation. Describing it as a passage through empty wilderness erases the people whose knowledge and resistance helped determine what the attackers could do.

The accounts bring the force out toward the open country and then into battle before the city. Morgan’s relation gives a detailed organization of his men and large claims about the opposing force and casualties. Exquemelin supplies another highly dramatic telling. Their exact-looking figures should remain attributed, rather than silently combined into a single audited tally. ^[1][2]

The campaign’s success did not begin at the first shot. It depended on maintaining a force through the approach, reaching supplies and preserving enough organization to act together.

After the city fell, parties searched outward for people and goods. Both the relation and the narrative describe prisoners; Exquemelin gives extensive accounts of cruelty. The commander’s report emphasizes the results of the expedition, while the narrative makes the pursuit of hidden property and ransom part of the occupation. ^[1][2]

The absence of all the wealth the attackers expected did not make the occupation harmless. People could suffer captivity and dispossession even when a company complained that its return was disappointing.

Exquemelin’s published narrative accuses Morgan of causing the fire. Morgan’s relation attributes burning to the defenders and claims an attempt to extinguish it. Haring discusses still other statements when weighing the dispute. The destruction is clear; a confident attribution needs more than choosing the most vivid story. ^[2][1][3]

The issue deserves its own comparison of the source claims. An illustration of burning buildings cannot settle who ordered or began the fire.

The relation follows the retreat through Venta Cruz to the Caribbean side, the collection of provisions, the division of returns and the departure for Jamaica. Captives remained inside that process. The expedition was not over merely because the force had entered the Pacific city. ^[1]

Back in Jamaica, the voyage was initially thanked and recorded by the council. Later questions about authorization and responsibility continued. Read Morgan’s career beside the claim of permission and the separate crossing of 1680.